In recent weeks, the U.S. has conducted at least nine rounds of airstrikes on Houthi military positions in Yemen in response to attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. However, it is not clear what these strikes hope to accomplish. Undeterred by threats of further retaliation, the Houthis have not only continued their attacks, but expanded their scope to target U.S.-owned vessels in the Gulf of Aden.
With the U.S. announcement of Operation Poseidon Archer, a formalization of its campaign to counter Houthi maritime attacks, many are asking who’ll come out on top in this showdown between the world’s pre-eminent superpower and a battle-hardened group known for taking on and defeating a list of ever-larger opponents.
Fighter #1: The United States
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In the first corner, we have the reigning world champion: the United States. In the months following Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel, the U.S. has provided unconditional support to Israel’s attack on Gaza despite its incredibly high civilian death toll and concerns Israel’s actions may amount to genocide. From the beginning, this support has included a maritime component, with the U.S. quickly deploying naval assets to the eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea to deter Iran and its aligned groups, who are allied with Hamas, from responding to the Gaza assault by attacking Israel.
These attacks nevertheless came, with the Houthis quickly distinguishing themselves among Iran’s allies. Beginning in mid-November 2023, Houthi forces started targeting commercial shipping in the Red Sea, mostly through missile and drone attacks. While the group has several reasons for conducting these attacks, they have repeatedly said they would stop them if and when Israel’s attack on Gaza stops.
That isn’t good enough for the U.S. With Houthi attacks forcing up shipping costs between Asia and Europe, the U.S. very much wants these attacks to end immediately, regardless of Israel’s actions in Gaza. While content to play defense by intercepting Houthi attacks for much of late 2023, amid mounting pressure to respond and a large-scale Houthi attack seemingly directed at U.S. forces on Jan. 9, the U.S. launched its first airstrikes on Houthi military sites in Yemen on Jan. 11.
In addition to subsequent strikes, formalized on Jan. 22 under the name Operation Poseidon Archer, the U.S. has also responded to these attacks by sanctioning Houthi financial networks, ramping up interdictions of weapons from Iran, and designating the Houthis as global terrorists.
Fighter #2: The Houthis
Understanding whether any of these actions will bring about the U.S.’ desired results requires looking more closely at who exactly are “the Houthis.” It may be better to start out by listing what the Houthis aren’t. They’re not a tribe. They’re not a tribal alliance. They’re not even a political party. At their heart, the Houthis are a movement that seeks to restore their interpretation of Zaidism, the sect of Islam traditionally dominant in northern Yemen, to what they view as its rightful place in Yemeni society.
If you ask Houthis what this means, they’ll often talk about combating corruption, protecting Yemen from outside aggressors, and strengthening their country’s “faith identity.” If you ask their critics, it effectively means setting up a theocracy, with human rights groups reporting conditions reminiscent of the Taliban in Houthi-held areas. Undisputedly, Houthi ideology also has an ingrained animosity toward the United States, Israel, and Jewish people, with the movement’s slogan reading “God is the Greatest, Death to America, Death to Israel, A Curse Upon the Jews, Victory to Islam.”
Starting in earnest as a marginal insurgency in the early 2000s, through a mix of smart politicking, assistance from Iran, and a demonstrated knack for violence, by October 2023 the Houthis had become the de facto rulers of the majority of Yemenis despite opposition from the Yemeni government and a Saudi-led coalition in Yemen’s decade-long civil war. At the time of Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack, the Houthis were in the late stages of talks with Saudi Arabia to negotiate a Saudi exit from the war and, most optimistically, end the war entirely with a Yemeni-led political process.
Without understating the Houthis’ very real commitment to Palestine (and antipathy to Israel), this context is key to understanding the Houthis’ enthusiasm for a fight with the U.S. While many Yemenis are willing to tolerate the Houthis when they can present themselves as protectors against a foreign invader like Saudi Arabia, their heavy-handed governance and attempts to impose their sectarian ideology have made them unpopular in periods of relative calm.
It was exactly such a period the Houthis found themselves in around Oct. 7 2023, with a long-running truce in the Yemen conflict depriving them of an enemy in Saudi Arabia and giving Yemenis enough space to organize some of the largest protests yet seen against the Houthis. In presenting themselves as defending Palestine, an incredibly popular issue across Yemen, the Houthis have been able to find a new enemy in Israel and “wag the dog” on these domestic problems.
For similar reasons, Houthi leaders don’t seem to mind scuffling with the United States, the “Big Bad” in their worldview. While probably not looking for all-out war, the Houthis are undeniably more willing to escalate the situation than the U.S., which doesn’t want to get dragged into Yemen’s seemingly unendable conflict against a group that has already endured several years of Saudi-led coalition airstrikes.
Place Your Bets
It’s this disparity in willingness to escalate that’s made many conclude the U.S. will simply not be able to force the Houthis to decide against launching attacks outside of ending Israel’s attack on Gaza. And even then, there are some who think they may keep going.
That leaves the question of whether the U.S. will be able to stop Houthi attacks as a military matter, and the jury is still out on that. While the Houthis intensified their attacks in the week after the initial U.S. strikes, there was in fact a noticeable lull the following week as the U.S. claimed several preemptive strikes against anti-ship missile launchers preparing to launch. Though this streak was broken on Jan. 24 when the Houthis launched three missiles at U.S.-flagged ships, all of these missiles were either intercepted or fell harmlessly into the water.
So, though much too early to tell for sure, there does seem to be a sense that through a combination of preemptive strikes on land and a defensive position at sea, the U.S. may be able to reduce, although not eliminate, successful Houthi missile attacks on ships passing near Yemen.
Unfortunately for shippers, that may actually not be enough. Looking at the anatomy of a typical Houthi shipping attack, one realizes there’s nothing about the attack itself that threatens the world economy. Many of the attacks have been misses, and even the hits have resulted in minimal damage and zero injuries. No, the thing that threatens the world economy is fear among shipowners and insurers who aren’t willing to risk something worse happening and as a result divert their ships or raise their rates.
And the Houthis have a lot of ways to sow fear, even if the U.S. takes out every missile launcher in Yemen. In addition to drone and missile attacks, the Houthis have also already seized one commercial vessel as part of their campaign, and have tried to seize several others. The group also possesses a panoply of remote-controlled IED boats and cheaply produced naval mines they have yet to really draw on. Even if they didn’t hit a single ship, just rumors of the Houthis deploying naval mines near Red Sea sea lanes could wreak havoc if shipowners are afraid they could lose their floating multimillion dollar investments and divert their ships.
So, while the U.S. may be able to contain Houthi shipping attacks to some extent, the movement’s seeming determination and multiple attack vectors means such a military-only strategy will likely only ever be partially successful. Whoever wins the Rumble in the Red Sea, it is clear it won’t be a knockout.
